openpilot is an open source driver assistance system. openpilot performs the functions of Automated Lane Centering and Adaptive Cruise Control for over 200 supported car makes and models.
You can not select more than 25 topics Topics must start with a letter or number, can include dashes ('-') and can be up to 35 characters long.

216 lines
6.8 KiB

// include first, needed by safety policies
#include "safety_declarations.h"
// Include the actual safety policies.
#include "safety/safety_defaults.h"
#include "safety/safety_honda.h"
#include "safety/safety_toyota.h"
#include "safety/safety_toyota_ipas.h"
#include "safety/safety_tesla.h"
#include "safety/safety_gm_ascm.h"
#include "safety/safety_gm.h"
#include "safety/safety_ford.h"
#include "safety/safety_cadillac.h"
#include "safety/safety_hyundai.h"
#include "safety/safety_chrysler.h"
#include "safety/safety_subaru.h"
#include "safety/safety_elm327.h"
const safety_hooks *current_hooks = &nooutput_hooks;
void safety_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push){
current_hooks->rx(to_push);
}
int safety_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
return current_hooks->tx(to_send);
}
int safety_tx_lin_hook(int lin_num, uint8_t *data, int len){
return current_hooks->tx_lin(lin_num, data, len);
}
// -1 = Disabled (Use GPIO to determine ignition)
// 0 = Off (not started)
// 1 = On (started)
int safety_ignition_hook() {
return current_hooks->ignition();
}
int safety_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
return current_hooks->fwd(bus_num, to_fwd);
}
typedef struct {
uint16_t id;
const safety_hooks *hooks;
} safety_hook_config;
Squashed 'panda/' changes from ae816c104..45d0d286f 45d0d286f remove whitespace (#255) e49d0dbbd Pedal: use avg between tracks (#253) c597dcc89 VERSION update after health packet changes and minor misra test change 01072bec0 Misra 11.x: pointer usage. (#250) fd68c26ab Propagate can_push errors (#249) ce1daf206 Misra check only done for EON config 70d4fd7f6 cleanup docker container on failure 04756a037 Turning back Misra check: unvoluntarily change fcb1208e1 fix weird code in USB_ReadPacket b983cc8fe Re-wrote test_misra.sh 0b1920636 Misra 17.7: The value returned by a function having non-void return type shall be used. We should hang on initial failed safety_set_mode 06ee8bd2d Ignore Misra 5.4 until cppcheck bug (?) is fixed 4be858224 Update cppcheck commit and pass predefined params to avoid impossible combinations of configs f45dd04c6 cppcheck: ignore redundantAssignment and selfAssignment for registers in llcan.h 9ce631155 Misra 12.1 (operator order) and 10.4 (incompatible essential types) fixes, arised after properly checking UID_BASE config 1cd34e564 Explicitly set the define and undefine for unknown configs in misra checks 5a024999d remove esp flash from run_automated_tests.sh 23e3684d7 Cppcheck unused functions (#247) c97d60be6 Removed bad language b031480a7 Missed adding Dockerfile 91ff6bb21 Run language checker in CI 205ec342a Improved language checker f7bbab072 Language checker test d9d0a62f2 Misra 5.5: missed this change from previous PR 85fa3c02a Misra 5.5: Identifiers shall be distinct from macro names (#246) 190d604a0 Pedal: 2 minor fixes to Misra 15.7 (else needed) and 17.7 (non-void output must be used) 8ea01ff12 Pedal: no built-in functions to avoid puts and putc re-definitions 1f40d1e6a Misra pedal (#245) a4554e3e6 Ignore advisory Misra 19.2: the union keyword should not be used e6dc4172b Minor indent error 247e128b4 Fix strict compiler on bootstub build ba6856921 Removed build strict test and enabled -Werror flag da11f0fa0 safety replay: update openpilot-tools after logreader fix fc8b9e49b Cppcheck: also check pedal f7bd2c2f3 Misra 10.4: fix last 2 violations (#242) 9be5fdead finished misra 17.8 (#241) 3c3aba3db Misra 10.4: Both operands of an operator in which the usual arithmetic conversions are performed shall have the same essential type category (#240) f2a3a177b Misra 15_7: fix what seems to be a false positive of cppcheck 812ace538 Misra 15_7: if … else if constructs should be terminated with an else clause (#230) 79e9735ae rename 5_wifi_udp.py 3c3ff0c03 Update Jenkinsfile (#239) 1bd928437 Misra 17.7: the value returned by a function having non-void return shall be used (#237) 18c9e88bc Merge pull request #238 from commaai/misra_17_8 7ac321de4 Merge pull request #235 from commaai/memxxx 004e543cc Jenkins: run EON test first 4bff28620 Merge branch 'memxxx' of github.com:commaai/panda into memxxx 7cd80de23 typo 385e33b32 12.1 regression 955842bae WIP ea908cbb7 10_1 violations: Operands shall not be of an inappropriate essential type (#233) fa3303805 Fix Misra 5.3: An identifier declared in an inner scope shall not hide an identifier declared in an outer scope (#236) ebfe1c512 Merge branch 'master' of github.com:commaai/panda into memxxx 8c11470ef Fix EON test case 64e18e841 fix inverted logic to differentiate between dev and EON panda builds 36755a0fd Merge branch 'master' of github.com:commaai/panda into memxxx e2981d612 skip wifi tests for EON panda build db2eec98c Merge branch 'master' of github.com:commaai/panda into memxxx 11257e79a Ignore test 5_wifi_udp.py_ignore: too unreliable for now 6973c2a81 fix wifi tests cf6985ad1 memxxx function changes to be Misra compliant 3a6cd2930 wifi threshold perc back to 20%. Problem wasn't this. d92a03528 faster docker build for safety replay 3e9469b3e Fixing tests after min->MIN change ecb9b6c01 Revert "Misra 10 1: Operands shall not be of an inappropriate essential type (#232)" 8732e4faf Misra 10 1: Operands shall not be of an inappropriate essential type (#232) git-subtree-dir: panda git-subtree-split: 45d0d286f4b5c893590a98ec1438b8a143b9605d old-commit-hash: 1ff59baea717f88e8038c01ead864ad5acb85f35
6 years ago
#define SAFETY_NOOUTPUT 0U
#define SAFETY_HONDA 1U
#define SAFETY_TOYOTA 2U
#define SAFETY_GM 3U
#define SAFETY_HONDA_BOSCH 4U
#define SAFETY_FORD 5U
#define SAFETY_CADILLAC 6U
#define SAFETY_HYUNDAI 7U
#define SAFETY_TESLA 8U
#define SAFETY_CHRYSLER 9U
#define SAFETY_SUBARU 10U
#define SAFETY_GM_ASCM 0x1334U
#define SAFETY_TOYOTA_IPAS 0x1335U
#define SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT 0x1337U
#define SAFETY_ELM327 0xE327U
const safety_hook_config safety_hook_registry[] = {
{SAFETY_NOOUTPUT, &nooutput_hooks},
{SAFETY_HONDA, &honda_hooks},
{SAFETY_HONDA_BOSCH, &honda_bosch_hooks},
{SAFETY_TOYOTA, &toyota_hooks},
{SAFETY_GM, &gm_hooks},
{SAFETY_FORD, &ford_hooks},
{SAFETY_CADILLAC, &cadillac_hooks},
{SAFETY_HYUNDAI, &hyundai_hooks},
{SAFETY_CHRYSLER, &chrysler_hooks},
{SAFETY_SUBARU, &subaru_hooks},
{SAFETY_TOYOTA_IPAS, &toyota_ipas_hooks},
{SAFETY_GM_ASCM, &gm_ascm_hooks},
{SAFETY_TESLA, &tesla_hooks},
{SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT, &alloutput_hooks},
{SAFETY_ELM327, &elm327_hooks},
};
int safety_set_mode(uint16_t mode, int16_t param) {
int set_status = -1; // not set
int hook_config_count = sizeof(safety_hook_registry) / sizeof(safety_hook_config);
for (int i = 0; i < hook_config_count; i++) {
if (safety_hook_registry[i].id == mode) {
current_hooks = safety_hook_registry[i].hooks;
set_status = 0; // set
break;
}
}
if ((set_status == 0) && (current_hooks->init != NULL)) {
current_hooks->init(param);
}
return set_status;
}
// compute the time elapsed (in microseconds) from 2 counter samples
// case where ts < ts_last is ok: overflow is properly re-casted into uint32_t
uint32_t get_ts_elapsed(uint32_t ts, uint32_t ts_last) {
return ts - ts_last;
}
// convert a trimmed integer to signed 32 bit int
int to_signed(int d, int bits) {
int d_signed = d;
if (d >= (1 << MAX((bits - 1), 0))) {
d_signed = d - (1 << MAX(bits, 0));
}
return d_signed;
}
// given a new sample, update the smaple_t struct
void update_sample(struct sample_t *sample, int sample_new) {
int sample_size = sizeof(sample->values) / sizeof(sample->values[0]);
for (int i = sample_size - 1; i > 0; i--) {
sample->values[i] = sample->values[i-1];
}
sample->values[0] = sample_new;
// get the minimum and maximum measured samples
sample->min = sample->values[0];
sample->max = sample->values[0];
for (int i = 1; i < sample_size; i++) {
if (sample->values[i] < sample->min) {
sample->min = sample->values[i];
}
if (sample->values[i] > sample->max) {
sample->max = sample->values[i];
}
}
}
bool max_limit_check(int val, const int MAX_VAL, const int MIN_VAL) {
return (val > MAX_VAL) || (val < MIN_VAL);
}
// check that commanded value isn't too far from measured
bool dist_to_meas_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_meas,
const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN, const int MAX_ERROR) {
// *** val rate limit check ***
int highest_allowed_rl = MAX(val_last, 0) + MAX_RATE_UP;
int lowest_allowed_rl = MIN(val_last, 0) - MAX_RATE_UP;
// if we've exceeded the meas val, we must start moving toward 0
int highest_allowed = MIN(highest_allowed_rl, MAX(val_last - MAX_RATE_DOWN, MAX(val_meas->max, 0) + MAX_ERROR));
int lowest_allowed = MAX(lowest_allowed_rl, MIN(val_last + MAX_RATE_DOWN, MIN(val_meas->min, 0) - MAX_ERROR));
// check for violation
return (val < lowest_allowed) || (val > highest_allowed);
}
// check that commanded value isn't fighting against driver
bool driver_limit_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_driver,
const int MAX_VAL, const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN,
const int MAX_ALLOWANCE, const int DRIVER_FACTOR) {
int highest_allowed_rl = MAX(val_last, 0) + MAX_RATE_UP;
int lowest_allowed_rl = MIN(val_last, 0) - MAX_RATE_UP;
int driver_max_limit = MAX_VAL + (MAX_ALLOWANCE + val_driver->max) * DRIVER_FACTOR;
int driver_min_limit = -MAX_VAL + (-MAX_ALLOWANCE + val_driver->min) * DRIVER_FACTOR;
// if we've exceeded the applied torque, we must start moving toward 0
int highest_allowed = MIN(highest_allowed_rl, MAX(val_last - MAX_RATE_DOWN,
MAX(driver_max_limit, 0)));
int lowest_allowed = MAX(lowest_allowed_rl, MIN(val_last + MAX_RATE_DOWN,
MIN(driver_min_limit, 0)));
// check for violation
return (val < lowest_allowed) || (val > highest_allowed);
}
// real time check, mainly used for steer torque rate limiter
bool rt_rate_limit_check(int val, int val_last, const int MAX_RT_DELTA) {
// *** torque real time rate limit check ***
int highest_val = MAX(val_last, 0) + MAX_RT_DELTA;
int lowest_val = MIN(val_last, 0) - MAX_RT_DELTA;
// check for violation
return (val < lowest_val) || (val > highest_val);
}
// interp function that holds extreme values
float interpolate(struct lookup_t xy, float x) {
int size = sizeof(xy.x) / sizeof(xy.x[0]);
float ret = xy.y[size - 1]; // default output is last point
// x is lower than the first point in the x array. Return the first point
if (x <= xy.x[0]) {
ret = xy.y[0];
} else {
// find the index such that (xy.x[i] <= x < xy.x[i+1]) and linearly interp
for (int i=0; i < (size - 1); i++) {
if (x < xy.x[i+1]) {
float x0 = xy.x[i];
float y0 = xy.y[i];
float dx = xy.x[i+1] - x0;
float dy = xy.y[i+1] - y0;
// dx should not be zero as xy.x is supposed ot be monotonic
if (dx <= 0.) {
dx = 0.0001;
}
ret = (dy * (x - x0) / dx) + y0;
break;
}
}
}
return ret;
}