diff --git a/VERSION b/VERSION
index 9cb4db99be..efdb8b1801 100644
--- a/VERSION
+++ b/VERSION
@@ -1 +1 @@
-v1.1.1
\ No newline at end of file
+v1.1.2
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/board/drivers/can.h b/board/drivers/can.h
index 839e46392b..cd809704b9 100644
--- a/board/drivers/can.h
+++ b/board/drivers/can.h
@@ -415,6 +415,9 @@ void can_rx(uint8_t can_number) {
     to_push.RDLR = CAN->sFIFOMailBox[0].RDLR;
     to_push.RDHR = CAN->sFIFOMailBox[0].RDHR;
 
+    // modify RDTR for our API
+    to_push.RDTR = (to_push.RDTR & 0xFFFF000F) | (bus_number << 4);
+
     // forwarding (panda only)
     #ifdef PANDA
       int bus_fwd_num = can_forwarding[bus_number] != -1 ? can_forwarding[bus_number] : safety_fwd_hook(bus_number, &to_push);
@@ -428,8 +431,6 @@ void can_rx(uint8_t can_number) {
       }
     #endif
 
-    // modify RDTR for our API
-    to_push.RDTR = (to_push.RDTR & 0xFFFF000F) | (bus_number << 4);
     safety_rx_hook(&to_push);
 
     #ifdef PANDA
@@ -460,14 +461,21 @@ void CAN3_SCE_IRQHandler() { can_sce(CAN3); }
 
 #endif
 
+#include "canbitbang.h"
+
 void can_send(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push, uint8_t bus_number) {
   if (safety_tx_hook(to_push) && !can_autobaud_enabled[bus_number]) {
     if (bus_number < BUS_MAX) {
       // add CAN packet to send queue
       // bus number isn't passed through
       to_push->RDTR &= 0xF;
-      can_push(can_queues[bus_number], to_push);
-      process_can(CAN_NUM_FROM_BUS_NUM(bus_number));
+      if (bus_number == 3 && can_num_lookup[3] == 0xFF) {
+        // TODO: why uint8 bro? only int8?
+        bitbang_gmlan(to_push);
+      } else {
+        can_push(can_queues[bus_number], to_push);
+        process_can(CAN_NUM_FROM_BUS_NUM(bus_number));
+      }
     }
   }
 }
diff --git a/board/drivers/canbitbang.h b/board/drivers/canbitbang.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..5226366b17
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/drivers/canbitbang.h
@@ -0,0 +1,203 @@
+#define MAX_BITS_CAN_PACKET (200)
+
+// returns out_len
+int do_bitstuff(char *out, char *in, int in_len) {
+  int last_bit = -1;
+  int bit_cnt = 0;
+  int j = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    char bit = in[i];
+    out[j++] = bit;
+
+    // do the stuffing
+    if (bit == last_bit) {
+      bit_cnt++;
+      if (bit_cnt == 5) {
+        // 5 in a row the same, do stuff
+        last_bit = !bit;
+        out[j++] = last_bit;
+        bit_cnt = 1;
+      }
+    } else {
+      // this is a new bit
+      last_bit = bit;
+      bit_cnt = 1;
+    }
+  }
+  return j;
+}
+
+int append_crc(char *in, int in_len) {
+  int crc = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < in_len; i++) {
+    crc <<= 1;
+    if (in[i] ^ ((crc>>15)&1)) {
+      crc = crc ^ 0x4599;
+    }
+    crc &= 0x7fff;
+  }
+  for (int i = 14; i >= 0; i--) {
+    in[in_len++] = (crc>>i)&1;
+  }
+  return in_len;
+}
+
+int append_bits(char *in, int in_len, char *app, int app_len) {
+  for (int i = 0; i < app_len; i++) {
+    in[in_len++] = app[i];
+  }
+  return in_len;
+}
+
+int append_int(char *in, int in_len, int val, int val_len) {
+  for (int i = val_len-1; i >= 0; i--) {
+    in[in_len++] = (val&(1<<i)) != 0;
+  }
+  return in_len;
+}
+
+int get_bit_message(char *out, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_bang) {
+  char pkt[MAX_BITS_CAN_PACKET];
+  char footer[] = {
+    1,  // CRC delimiter
+    1,  // ACK
+    1,  // ACK delimiter
+    1,1,1,1,1,1,1, // EOF
+    1,1,1, // IFS
+  };
+
+  int len = 0;
+
+  // test packet
+  int dlc_len = to_bang->RDTR & 0xF;
+  len = append_int(pkt, len, 0, 1);    // Start-of-frame
+  
+  if (to_bang->RIR & 4) {
+    // extended identifier
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, to_bang->RIR >> 21, 11);  // Identifier
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, 3, 2);    // SRR+IDE
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, (to_bang->RIR >> 3) & ((1<<18)-1), 18);  // Identifier
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, 0, 3);    // RTR+r1+r0
+  } else {
+    // standard identifier
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, to_bang->RIR >> 21, 11);  // Identifier
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, 0, 3);    // RTR+IDE+reserved
+  }
+
+  len = append_int(pkt, len, dlc_len, 4);    // Data length code
+
+  // append data
+  for (int i = 0; i < dlc_len; i++) {
+    unsigned char dat = ((unsigned char *)(&(to_bang->RDLR)))[i];
+    len = append_int(pkt, len, dat, 8);
+  }
+
+  // append crc
+  len = append_crc(pkt, len);
+
+  // do bitstuffing
+  len = do_bitstuff(out, pkt, len);
+
+  // append footer
+  len = append_bits(out, len, footer, sizeof(footer));
+  return len;
+}
+
+// hardware stuff below this line
+
+#ifdef PANDA
+
+void set_bitbanged_gmlan(int val) {
+  if (val) {
+    GPIOB->ODR |= (1 << 13);
+  } else {
+    GPIOB->ODR &= ~(1 << 13);
+  }
+}
+
+char pkt_stuffed[MAX_BITS_CAN_PACKET];
+int gmlan_sending = -1;
+int gmlan_sendmax = -1;
+
+int gmlan_silent_count = 0;
+int gmlan_fail_count = 0;
+#define REQUIRED_SILENT_TIME 10
+#define MAX_FAIL_COUNT 10
+
+void TIM4_IRQHandler(void) {
+  if (TIM4->SR & TIM_SR_UIF && gmlan_sendmax != -1) {
+    int read = get_gpio_input(GPIOB, 12);
+    if (gmlan_silent_count < REQUIRED_SILENT_TIME) {
+      if (read == 0) {
+        gmlan_silent_count = 0;
+      } else {
+        gmlan_silent_count++;
+      }
+    } else if (gmlan_silent_count == REQUIRED_SILENT_TIME) {
+      int retry = 0;
+      // in send loop
+      if (gmlan_sending > 0 &&  // not first bit
+         (read == 0 && pkt_stuffed[gmlan_sending-1] == 1) &&  // bus wrongly dominant
+         gmlan_sending != (gmlan_sendmax-11)) {    //not ack bit
+        puts("GMLAN ERR: bus driven at ");
+        puth(gmlan_sending);
+        puts("\n");
+        retry = 1;
+      } else if (read == 1 && gmlan_sending == (gmlan_sendmax-11)) {    // recessive during ACK
+        puts("GMLAN ERR: didn't recv ACK\n");
+        retry = 1;
+      }
+      if (retry) {
+        // reset sender (retry after 7 silent)
+        set_bitbanged_gmlan(1); // recessive
+        gmlan_silent_count = 0;
+        gmlan_sending = 0;
+        gmlan_fail_count++;
+        if (gmlan_fail_count == MAX_FAIL_COUNT) {
+          puts("GMLAN ERR: giving up send\n");
+        }
+      } else {
+        set_bitbanged_gmlan(pkt_stuffed[gmlan_sending]);
+        gmlan_sending++;
+      }
+    }
+    if (gmlan_sending == gmlan_sendmax || gmlan_fail_count == MAX_FAIL_COUNT) {
+      set_bitbanged_gmlan(1); // recessive
+      set_gpio_mode(GPIOB, 13, MODE_INPUT);
+      TIM4->DIER = 0;  // no update interrupt
+      TIM4->CR1 = 0;   // disable timer
+      gmlan_sendmax = -1;   // exit
+    }
+  }
+  TIM4->SR = 0;
+}
+
+void bitbang_gmlan(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_bang) {
+  // TODO: make failure less silent
+  if (gmlan_sendmax != -1) return;
+
+  int len = get_bit_message(pkt_stuffed, to_bang);
+  gmlan_fail_count = 0;
+  gmlan_silent_count = 0;
+  gmlan_sending = 0;
+  gmlan_sendmax = len;
+
+  // setup for bitbang loop
+  set_bitbanged_gmlan(1); // recessive
+  set_gpio_mode(GPIOB, 13, MODE_OUTPUT);
+
+  // setup
+  TIM4->PSC = 48-1;          // tick on 1 us
+  TIM4->CR1 = TIM_CR1_CEN;   // enable
+  TIM4->ARR = 30-1;          // 33.3 kbps
+
+  // in case it's disabled
+  NVIC_EnableIRQ(TIM4_IRQn);
+
+  // run the interrupt
+  TIM4->DIER = TIM_DIER_UIE; // update interrupt
+  TIM4->SR = 0;
+}
+
+#endif
+
diff --git a/board/gpio.h b/board/gpio.h
index 7b2812e7b4..6112f6f887 100644
--- a/board/gpio.h
+++ b/board/gpio.h
@@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ void periph_init() {
   RCC->APB1ENR |= RCC_APB1ENR_DACEN;
   RCC->APB1ENR |= RCC_APB1ENR_TIM2EN;
   RCC->APB1ENR |= RCC_APB1ENR_TIM3EN;
-  //RCC->APB1ENR |= RCC_APB1ENR_TIM4EN;
+  RCC->APB1ENR |= RCC_APB1ENR_TIM4EN;
   RCC->APB2ENR |= RCC_APB2ENR_USART1EN;
   RCC->AHB2ENR |= RCC_AHB2ENR_OTGFSEN;
   RCC->APB2ENR |= RCC_APB2ENR_TIM1EN;
diff --git a/board/safety.h b/board/safety.h
index 89b9e090ea..411d757a9b 100644
--- a/board/safety.h
+++ b/board/safety.h
@@ -1,7 +1,24 @@
+// sample struct that keeps 3 samples in memory
+struct sample_t {
+  int values[6];
+  int min;
+  int max;
+} sample_t_default = {{0}, 0, 0};
+
 void safety_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
 int safety_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send);
 int safety_tx_lin_hook(int lin_num, uint8_t *data, int len);
 int safety_ignition_hook();
+uint32_t get_ts_elapsed(uint32_t ts, uint32_t ts_last);
+int to_signed(int d, int bits);
+void update_sample(struct sample_t *sample, int sample_new);
+int max_limit_check(int val, const int MAX);
+int dist_to_meas_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_meas,
+  const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN, const int MAX_ERROR);
+int driver_limit_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_driver,
+  const int MAX, const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN, 
+  const int MAX_ALLOWANCE, const int DRIVER_FACTOR);
+int rt_rate_limit_check(int val, int val_last, const int MAX_RT_DELTA);
 
 typedef void (*safety_hook_init)(int16_t param);
 typedef void (*rx_hook)(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
@@ -31,6 +48,7 @@ int controls_allowed = 0;
 #endif
 #include "safety/safety_gm.h"
 #include "safety/safety_ford.h"
+#include "safety/safety_cadillac.h"
 #include "safety/safety_elm327.h"
 
 const safety_hooks *current_hooks = &nooutput_hooks;
@@ -68,6 +86,7 @@ typedef struct {
 #define SAFETY_GM 3
 #define SAFETY_HONDA_BOSCH 4
 #define SAFETY_FORD 5
+#define SAFETY_CADILLAC 6
 #define SAFETY_TOYOTA_IPAS 0x1335
 #define SAFETY_TOYOTA_NOLIMITS 0x1336
 #define SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT 0x1337
@@ -80,6 +99,7 @@ const safety_hook_config safety_hook_registry[] = {
   {SAFETY_TOYOTA, &toyota_hooks},
   {SAFETY_GM, &gm_hooks},
   {SAFETY_FORD, &ford_hooks},
+  {SAFETY_CADILLAC, &cadillac_hooks},
   {SAFETY_TOYOTA_NOLIMITS, &toyota_nolimits_hooks},
 #ifdef PANDA
   {SAFETY_TOYOTA_IPAS, &toyota_ipas_hooks},
@@ -101,3 +121,83 @@ int safety_set_mode(uint16_t mode, int16_t param) {
   return -1;
 }
 
+// compute the time elapsed (in microseconds) from 2 counter samples
+uint32_t get_ts_elapsed(uint32_t ts, uint32_t ts_last) {
+  return ts > ts_last ? ts - ts_last : (0xFFFFFFFF - ts_last) + 1 + ts;
+}
+
+// convert a trimmed integer to signed 32 bit int
+int to_signed(int d, int bits) {
+  if (d >= (1 << (bits - 1))) {
+    d -= (1 << bits);
+  }
+  return d;
+}
+
+// given a new sample, update the smaple_t struct
+void update_sample(struct sample_t *sample, int sample_new) {
+  for (int i = sizeof(sample->values)/sizeof(sample->values[0]) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
+    sample->values[i] = sample->values[i-1];
+  }
+  sample->values[0] = sample_new;
+
+  // get the minimum and maximum measured samples
+  sample->min = sample->max = sample->values[0];
+  for (int i = 1; i < sizeof(sample->values)/sizeof(sample->values[0]); i++) {
+    if (sample->values[i] < sample->min) sample->min = sample->values[i];
+    if (sample->values[i] > sample->max) sample->max = sample->values[i];
+  }
+}
+
+int max_limit_check(int val, const int MAX) {
+  return (val > MAX) | (val < -MAX);
+}
+
+// check that commanded value isn't too far from measured
+int dist_to_meas_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_meas,
+  const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN, const int MAX_ERROR) {
+
+  // *** val rate limit check ***
+  int16_t highest_allowed_val = max(val_last, 0) + MAX_RATE_UP;
+  int16_t lowest_allowed_val = min(val_last, 0) - MAX_RATE_UP;
+
+  // if we've exceeded the meas val, we must start moving toward 0
+  highest_allowed_val = min(highest_allowed_val, max(val_last - MAX_RATE_DOWN, max(val_meas->max, 0) + MAX_ERROR));
+  lowest_allowed_val = max(lowest_allowed_val, min(val_last + MAX_RATE_DOWN, min(val_meas->min, 0) - MAX_ERROR));
+
+  // check for violation
+  return (val < lowest_allowed_val) || (val > highest_allowed_val);
+}
+
+// check that commanded value isn't fighting against driver
+int driver_limit_check(int val, int val_last, struct sample_t *val_driver,
+  const int MAX, const int MAX_RATE_UP, const int MAX_RATE_DOWN,
+  const int MAX_ALLOWANCE, const int DRIVER_FACTOR) {
+
+  int highest_allowed = max(val_last, 0) + MAX_RATE_UP;
+  int lowest_allowed = min(val_last, 0) - MAX_RATE_UP;
+
+  int driver_max_limit = MAX + (MAX_ALLOWANCE + val_driver->max) * DRIVER_FACTOR;
+  int driver_min_limit = -MAX + (-MAX_ALLOWANCE + val_driver->min) * DRIVER_FACTOR;
+
+  // if we've exceeded the applied torque, we must start moving toward 0
+  highest_allowed = min(highest_allowed, max(val_last - MAX_RATE_DOWN,
+                                             max(driver_max_limit, 0)));
+  lowest_allowed = max(lowest_allowed, min(val_last + MAX_RATE_DOWN,
+                                           min(driver_min_limit, 0)));
+
+  // check for violation
+  return (val < lowest_allowed) || (val > highest_allowed);
+}
+
+
+// real time check, mainly used for steer torque rate limiter
+int rt_rate_limit_check(int val, int val_last, const int MAX_RT_DELTA) {
+
+  // *** torque real time rate limit check ***
+  int16_t highest_val = max(val_last, 0) + MAX_RT_DELTA;
+  int16_t lowest_val = min(val_last, 0) - MAX_RT_DELTA;
+
+  // check for violation
+  return (val < lowest_val) || (val > highest_val);
+}
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_cadillac.h b/board/safety/safety_cadillac.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..dfc15d0a35
--- /dev/null
+++ b/board/safety/safety_cadillac.h
@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+const int CADILLAC_MAX_STEER = 150; // 1s
+// real time torque limit to prevent controls spamming
+// the real time limit is 1500/sec
+const int CADILLAC_MAX_RT_DELTA = 75;       // max delta torque allowed for real time checks
+const int32_t CADILLAC_RT_INTERVAL = 250000;    // 250ms between real time checks
+const int CADILLAC_MAX_RATE_UP = 2;
+const int CADILLAC_MAX_RATE_DOWN = 5;
+const int CADILLAC_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE = 50;
+const int CADILLAC_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR = 4;
+
+int cadillac_ign = 0;
+int cadillac_cruise_engaged_last = 0;
+int cadillac_rt_torque_last = 0;
+int cadillac_desired_torque_last[4] = {0};      // 4 torque messages
+uint32_t cadillac_ts_last = 0;
+int cadillac_supercruise_on = 0;
+struct sample_t cadillac_torque_driver;         // last few driver torques measured
+
+int cadillac_get_torque_idx(uint32_t addr) {
+  if (addr==0x151) return 0;
+  else if (addr==0x152) return 1;
+  else if (addr==0x153) return 2;
+  else return 3;
+}
+
+static void cadillac_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
+  int bus_number = (to_push->RDTR >> 4) & 0xFF;
+  uint32_t addr = to_push->RIR >> 21;
+
+  if (addr == 356) {
+    int torque_driver_new = ((to_push->RDLR & 0x7) << 8) | ((to_push->RDLR >> 8) & 0xFF);
+    torque_driver_new = to_signed(torque_driver_new, 11);
+    // update array of samples
+    update_sample(&cadillac_torque_driver, torque_driver_new);
+  }
+
+  // this message isn't all zeros when ignition is on
+  if (addr == 0x160 && bus_number == 0) {
+    cadillac_ign = to_push->RDLR > 0;
+  }
+
+  // enter controls on rising edge of ACC, exit controls on ACC off
+  if ((addr == 0x370) && (bus_number == 0)) {
+    int cruise_engaged = to_push->RDLR & 0x800000;  // bit 23
+    if (cruise_engaged && !cadillac_cruise_engaged_last) {
+      controls_allowed = 1;
+    } else if (!cruise_engaged) {
+      controls_allowed = 0;
+    }
+    cadillac_cruise_engaged_last = cruise_engaged;
+  }
+
+  // know supercruise mode and block openpilot msgs if on
+  if ((addr == 0x152) || (addr == 0x154)) {
+    cadillac_supercruise_on = (to_push->RDHR>>4) & 0x1;
+  }
+}
+
+static int cadillac_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
+  uint32_t addr = to_send->RIR >> 21;
+
+  // steer cmd checks
+  if (addr == 0x151 || addr == 0x152 || addr == 0x153 || addr == 0x154) {
+    int desired_torque = ((to_send->RDLR & 0x3f) << 8) + ((to_send->RDLR & 0xff00) >> 8);
+    int violation = 0;
+    uint32_t ts = TIM2->CNT;
+    int idx = cadillac_get_torque_idx(addr);
+    desired_torque = to_signed(desired_torque, 14);
+
+    if (controls_allowed) {
+
+      // *** global torque limit check ***
+      violation |= max_limit_check(desired_torque, CADILLAC_MAX_STEER);
+
+      // *** torque rate limit check ***
+      int desired_torque_last = cadillac_desired_torque_last[idx];
+      violation |= driver_limit_check(desired_torque, desired_torque_last, &cadillac_torque_driver,
+        CADILLAC_MAX_STEER, CADILLAC_MAX_RATE_UP, CADILLAC_MAX_RATE_DOWN,
+        CADILLAC_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE, CADILLAC_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR);
+
+      // used next time
+      cadillac_desired_torque_last[idx] = desired_torque;
+
+      // *** torque real time rate limit check ***
+      violation |= rt_rate_limit_check(desired_torque, cadillac_rt_torque_last, CADILLAC_MAX_RT_DELTA);
+
+      // every RT_INTERVAL set the new limits
+      uint32_t ts_elapsed = get_ts_elapsed(ts, cadillac_ts_last);
+      if (ts_elapsed > CADILLAC_RT_INTERVAL) {
+        cadillac_rt_torque_last = desired_torque;
+        cadillac_ts_last = ts;
+      }
+    }
+
+    // no torque if controls is not allowed
+    if (!controls_allowed && (desired_torque != 0)) {
+      violation = 1;
+    }
+
+    // reset to 0 if either controls is not allowed or there's a violation
+    if (violation || !controls_allowed) {
+      cadillac_desired_torque_last[idx] = 0;
+      cadillac_rt_torque_last = 0;
+      cadillac_ts_last = ts;
+    }
+
+    if (violation || cadillac_supercruise_on) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+  }
+  return true;
+}
+
+static void cadillac_init(int16_t param) {
+  controls_allowed = 0;
+  cadillac_ign = 0;
+}
+
+static int cadillac_ign_hook() {
+  return cadillac_ign;
+}
+
+const safety_hooks cadillac_hooks = {
+  .init = cadillac_init,
+  .rx = cadillac_rx_hook,
+  .tx = cadillac_tx_hook,
+  .tx_lin = alloutput_tx_lin_hook,
+  .ignition = cadillac_ign_hook,
+  .fwd = alloutput_fwd_hook,
+};
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_defaults.h b/board/safety/safety_defaults.h
index 16ab3643f8..8042cc3ce0 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_defaults.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_defaults.h
@@ -1,5 +1,9 @@
 void default_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {}
 
+int default_ign_hook() {
+  return -1; // use GPIO to determine ignition
+}
+
 // *** no output safety mode ***
 
 static void nooutput_init(int16_t param) {
@@ -14,9 +18,6 @@ static int nooutput_tx_lin_hook(int lin_num, uint8_t *data, int len) {
   return false;
 }
 
-static int nooutput_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
 static int nooutput_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
@@ -26,7 +27,7 @@ const safety_hooks nooutput_hooks = {
   .rx = default_rx_hook,
   .tx = nooutput_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = nooutput_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = nooutput_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = nooutput_fwd_hook,
 };
 
@@ -44,10 +45,6 @@ static int alloutput_tx_lin_hook(int lin_num, uint8_t *data, int len) {
   return true;
 }
 
-static int alloutput_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
-
 static int alloutput_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
@@ -57,7 +54,7 @@ const safety_hooks alloutput_hooks = {
   .rx = default_rx_hook,
   .tx = alloutput_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = alloutput_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = alloutput_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = alloutput_fwd_hook,
 };
 
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_elm327.h b/board/safety/safety_elm327.h
index 0b23fa5dac..98dce6532a 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_elm327.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_elm327.h
@@ -31,10 +31,6 @@ static void elm327_init(int16_t param) {
   controls_allowed = 1;
 }
 
-static int elm327_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
-
 static int elm327_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
@@ -44,6 +40,6 @@ const safety_hooks elm327_hooks = {
   .rx = elm327_rx_hook,
   .tx = elm327_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = elm327_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = elm327_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = elm327_fwd_hook,
 };
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_ford.h b/board/safety/safety_ford.h
index 55b9900387..804064842b 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_ford.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_ford.h
@@ -96,15 +96,11 @@ static int ford_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
 
-static int ford_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
-
 const safety_hooks ford_hooks = {
   .init = ford_init,
   .rx = ford_rx_hook,
   .tx = ford_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = ford_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = ford_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = ford_fwd_hook,
 };
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_gm.h b/board/safety/safety_gm.h
index 03c36d6255..e70332c1eb 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_gm.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_gm.h
@@ -8,15 +8,27 @@
 //      brake rising edge
 //      brake > 0mph
 
-// gm_: poor man's namespacing
+const int GM_MAX_STEER = 255;
+const int GM_MAX_RT_DELTA = 128;          // max delta torque allowed for real time checks
+const int32_t GM_RT_INTERVAL = 250000;    // 250ms between real time checks
+const int GM_MAX_RATE_UP = 7;
+const int GM_MAX_RATE_DOWN = 17;
+const int GM_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE = 50;
+const int GM_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR = 4;
+const int GM_MAX_GAS = 3072;
+const int GM_MAX_REGEN = 1404;
+const int GM_MAX_BRAKE = 350;
+
 int gm_brake_prev = 0;
 int gm_gas_prev = 0;
 int gm_speed = 0;
-
 // silence everything if stock ECUs are still online
 int gm_ascm_detected = 0;
-
 int gm_ignition_started = 0;
+int gm_rt_torque_last = 0;
+int gm_desired_torque_last = 0;
+uint32_t gm_ts_last = 0;
+struct sample_t gm_torque_driver;         // last few driver torques measured
 
 static void gm_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
   int bus_number = (to_push->RDTR >> 4) & 0xFF;
@@ -31,10 +43,18 @@ static void gm_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
     addr = to_push->RIR >> 21;
   }
 
-  if (addr == 0x135 && bus_number == 0) {
-    //Gear selector (used for determining ignition)
-    int gear = to_push->RDLR & 0x7;
-    gm_ignition_started = gear > 0; //Park = 0. If out of park, we're "on."
+  if (addr == 388) {
+    int torque_driver_new = (((to_push->RDHR >> 16) & 0x7) << 8) | ((to_push->RDHR >> 24) & 0xFF);
+    torque_driver_new = to_signed(torque_driver_new, 11);
+    // update array of samples
+    update_sample(&gm_torque_driver, torque_driver_new);
+  }
+
+  if (addr == 0x1f1 && bus_number == 0) {
+    //Bit 5 should be ignition "on"
+    //Backup plan is Bit 2 (accessory power)
+    uint32_t ign = (to_push->RDLR) & 0x20;
+    gm_ignition_started = ign > 0;
   }
 
   // sample speed, really only care if car is moving or not
@@ -126,7 +146,7 @@ static int gm_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
     int brake = ((rdlr & 0xF) << 8) + ((rdlr & 0xFF00) >> 8);
     brake = (0x1000 - brake) & 0xFFF;
     if (current_controls_allowed) {
-      if (brake > 255) return 0;
+      if (brake > GM_MAX_BRAKE) return 0;
     } else {
       if (brake != 0) return 0;
     }
@@ -135,17 +155,49 @@ static int gm_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
   // LKA STEER: safety check
   if (addr == 384) {
     int rdlr = to_send->RDLR;
-    int steer = ((rdlr & 0x7) << 8) + ((rdlr & 0xFF00) >> 8);
-    int max_steer = 255;
+    int desired_torque = ((rdlr & 0x7) << 8) + ((rdlr & 0xFF00) >> 8);
+    uint32_t ts = TIM2->CNT;
+    int violation = 0;
+    desired_torque = to_signed(desired_torque, 11);
+
     if (current_controls_allowed) {
-      // Signed arithmetic
-      if (steer & 0x400) {
-        if (steer < (0x800 - max_steer)) return 0;
-      } else {
-        if (steer > max_steer) return 0;
+
+      // *** global torque limit check ***
+      violation |= max_limit_check(desired_torque, GM_MAX_STEER);
+
+      // *** torque rate limit check ***
+      violation |= driver_limit_check(desired_torque, gm_desired_torque_last, &gm_torque_driver,
+        GM_MAX_STEER, GM_MAX_RATE_UP, GM_MAX_RATE_DOWN,
+        GM_DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE, GM_DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR);
+
+      // used next time
+      gm_desired_torque_last = desired_torque;
+
+      // *** torque real time rate limit check ***
+      violation |= rt_rate_limit_check(desired_torque, gm_rt_torque_last, GM_MAX_RT_DELTA);
+
+      // every RT_INTERVAL set the new limits
+      uint32_t ts_elapsed = get_ts_elapsed(ts, gm_ts_last);
+      if (ts_elapsed > GM_RT_INTERVAL) {
+        gm_rt_torque_last = desired_torque;
+        gm_ts_last = ts;
       }
-    } else {
-      if (steer != 0) return 0;
+    }
+
+    // no torque if controls is not allowed
+    if (!current_controls_allowed && (desired_torque != 0)) {
+      violation = 1;
+    }
+
+    // reset to 0 if either controls is not allowed or there's a violation
+    if (violation || !current_controls_allowed) {
+      gm_desired_torque_last = 0;
+      gm_rt_torque_last = 0;
+      gm_ts_last = ts;
+    }
+
+    if (violation) {
+      return false;
     }
   }
 
@@ -158,11 +210,11 @@ static int gm_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
     int gas_regen = ((rdlr & 0x7F0000) >> 11) + ((rdlr & 0xF8000000) >> 27);
     int apply = rdlr & 1;
     if (current_controls_allowed) {
-      if (gas_regen > 3072) return 0;
+      if (gas_regen > GM_MAX_GAS) return 0;
     } else {
       // Disabled message is !engaed with gas
       // value that corresponds to max regen.
-      if (apply || gas_regen != 1404) return 0;
+      if (apply || gas_regen != GM_MAX_REGEN) return 0;
     }
   }
 
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_honda.h b/board/safety/safety_honda.h
index bc6ce6e9c0..b64e45ce6d 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_honda.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_honda.h
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@ int gas_interceptor_prev = 0;
 int ego_speed = 0;
 // TODO: auto-detect bosch hardware based on CAN messages?
 bool bosch_hardware = false;
+bool honda_alt_brake_msg = false;
 
 static void honda_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
 
@@ -36,11 +37,14 @@ static void honda_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
     }
   }
 
-  // user brake signal is different for nidec vs bosch hardware
-  // nidec hardware: 0x17C bit 53
-  // bosch hardware: 0x1BE bit 4
-  #define IS_USER_BRAKE_MSG(to_push) (!bosch_hardware ? to_push->RIR>>21 == 0x17C : to_push->RIR>>21 == 0x1BE)
-  #define USER_BRAKE_VALUE(to_push)  (!bosch_hardware ? to_push->RDHR & 0x200000  : to_push->RDLR & 0x10)
+  // user brake signal on 0x17C reports applied brake from computer brake on accord
+  // and crv, which prevents the usual brake safety from working correctly. these
+  // cars have a signal on 0x1BE which only detects user's brake being applied so
+  // in these cases, this is used instead.
+  // most hondas: 0x17C bit 53
+  // accord, crv: 0x1BE bit 4
+  #define IS_USER_BRAKE_MSG(to_push) (!honda_alt_brake_msg ? to_push->RIR>>21 == 0x17C : to_push->RIR>>21 == 0x1BE)
+  #define USER_BRAKE_VALUE(to_push)  (!honda_alt_brake_msg ? to_push->RDHR & 0x200000  : to_push->RDLR & 0x10)
   // exit controls on rising edge of brake press or on brake press when
   // speed > 0
   if (IS_USER_BRAKE_MSG(to_push)) {
@@ -115,6 +119,14 @@ static int honda_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
       if ((to_send->RDLR & 0xFFFF0000) != to_send->RDLR) return 0;
     }
   }
+  
+  // FORCE CANCEL: safety check only relevant when spamming the cancel button in Bosch HW
+  // ensuring that only the cancel button press is sent (VAL 2) when controls are off.
+  // This avoids unintended engagements while still allowing resume spam
+  if (((to_send->RIR>>21) == 0x296) && bosch_hardware &&
+      !current_controls_allowed && ((to_send->RDTR >> 4) & 0xFF) == 0) {
+    if (((to_send->RDLR >> 5) & 0x7) != 2) return 0;
+  }
 
   // 1 allows the message through
   return true;
@@ -128,28 +140,27 @@ static int honda_tx_lin_hook(int lin_num, uint8_t *data, int len) {
 static void honda_init(int16_t param) {
   controls_allowed = 0;
   bosch_hardware = false;
+  honda_alt_brake_msg = false;
 }
 
 static int honda_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
 
-static int honda_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
-
 const safety_hooks honda_hooks = {
   .init = honda_init,
   .rx = honda_rx_hook,
   .tx = honda_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = honda_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = honda_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = honda_fwd_hook,
 };
 
 static void honda_bosch_init(int16_t param) {
   controls_allowed = 0;
   bosch_hardware = true;
+  // Checking for alternate brake override from safety parameter
+  honda_alt_brake_msg = param == 1 ? true : false;
 }
 
 static int honda_bosch_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
@@ -165,6 +176,6 @@ const safety_hooks honda_bosch_hooks = {
   .rx = honda_rx_hook,
   .tx = honda_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = honda_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = honda_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = honda_bosch_fwd_hook,
 };
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_toyota.h b/board/safety/safety_toyota.h
index c78e090d09..da4bd388dd 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_toyota.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_toyota.h
@@ -1,64 +1,45 @@
-// track the torque measured for limiting
-struct sample_t {
-  int values[3];
-  int min;
-  int max;
-} sample_t_default = {{0, 0, 0}, 0, 0};
 struct sample_t torque_meas;           // last 3 motor torques produced by the eps
 
 // global torque limit
-const int32_t MAX_TORQUE = 1500;       // max torque cmd allowed ever
+const int MAX_TORQUE = 1500;       // max torque cmd allowed ever
 
 // rate based torque limit + stay within actually applied
 // packet is sent at 100hz, so this limit is 1000/sec
-const int32_t MAX_RATE_UP = 10;        // ramp up slow
-const int32_t MAX_RATE_DOWN = 25;      // ramp down fast
-const int32_t MAX_TORQUE_ERROR = 350;  // max torque cmd in excess of torque motor
+const int MAX_RATE_UP = 10;        // ramp up slow
+const int MAX_RATE_DOWN = 25;      // ramp down fast
+const int MAX_TORQUE_ERROR = 350;  // max torque cmd in excess of torque motor
 
 // real time torque limit to prevent controls spamming
 // the real time limit is 1500/sec
-const int32_t MAX_RT_DELTA = 375;      // max delta torque allowed for real time checks
-const int32_t RT_INTERVAL = 250000;    // 250ms between real time checks
+const int MAX_RT_DELTA = 375;      // max delta torque allowed for real time checks
+const int RT_INTERVAL = 250000;    // 250ms between real time checks
 
 // longitudinal limits
-const int16_t MAX_ACCEL = 1500;        // 1.5 m/s2
-const int16_t MIN_ACCEL = -3000;       // 3.0 m/s2
+const int MAX_ACCEL = 1500;        // 1.5 m/s2
+const int MIN_ACCEL = -3000;       // 3.0 m/s2
 
 // global actuation limit state
 int actuation_limits = 1;              // by default steer limits are imposed
-int16_t dbc_eps_torque_factor = 100;   // conversion factor for STEER_TORQUE_EPS in %: see dbc file
+int dbc_eps_torque_factor = 100;   // conversion factor for STEER_TORQUE_EPS in %: see dbc file
 
 // state of torque limits
-int16_t desired_torque_last = 0;       // last desired steer torque
-int16_t rt_torque_last = 0;            // last desired torque for real time check
+int desired_torque_last = 0;       // last desired steer torque
+int rt_torque_last = 0;            // last desired torque for real time check
 uint32_t ts_last = 0;
 int cruise_engaged_last = 0;           // cruise state
 
-uint32_t get_ts_elapsed(uint32_t ts, uint32_t ts_last) {
-  return ts > ts_last ? ts - ts_last : (0xFFFFFFFF - ts_last) + 1 + ts;
-}
-
-void update_sample(struct sample_t *sample, int sample_new) {
-  for (int i = sizeof(sample->values)/sizeof(sample->values[0]) - 1; i > 0; i--) {
-    sample->values[i] = sample->values[i-1];
-  }
-  sample->values[0] = sample_new;
-
-  // get the minimum and maximum measured torque over the last 3 frames
-  sample->min = sample->max = sample->values[0];
-  for (int i = 1; i < sizeof(sample->values)/sizeof(sample->values[0]); i++) {
-    if (sample->values[i] < sample->min) sample->min = sample->values[i];
-    if (sample->values[i] > sample->max) sample->max = sample->values[i];
-  }
-}
 
 static void toyota_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push) {
   // get eps motor torque (0.66 factor in dbc)
   if ((to_push->RIR>>21) == 0x260) {
-    int16_t torque_meas_new_16 = (((to_push->RDHR) & 0xFF00) | ((to_push->RDHR >> 16) & 0xFF));
+    int torque_meas_new = (((to_push->RDHR) & 0xFF00) | ((to_push->RDHR >> 16) & 0xFF));
+    torque_meas_new = to_signed(torque_meas_new, 16);
+
+    // scale by dbc_factor
+    torque_meas_new = (torque_meas_new * dbc_eps_torque_factor) / 100;
 
     // increase torque_meas by 1 to be conservative on rounding
-    int torque_meas_new = ((int)(torque_meas_new_16) * dbc_eps_torque_factor / 100) + (torque_meas_new_16 > 0 ? 1 : -1);
+    torque_meas_new += (torque_meas_new > 0 ? 1 : -1);
 
     // update array of sample
     update_sample(&torque_meas, torque_meas_new);
@@ -87,7 +68,8 @@ static int toyota_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
 
     // ACCEL: safety check on byte 1-2
     if ((to_send->RIR>>21) == 0x343) {
-      int16_t desired_accel = ((to_send->RDLR & 0xFF) << 8) | ((to_send->RDLR >> 8) & 0xFF);
+      int desired_accel = ((to_send->RDLR & 0xFF) << 8) | ((to_send->RDLR >> 8) & 0xFF);
+      desired_accel = to_signed(desired_accel, 16);
       if (controls_allowed && actuation_limits) {
         if ((desired_accel > MAX_ACCEL) || (desired_accel < MIN_ACCEL)) {
           return 0;
@@ -99,8 +81,9 @@ static int toyota_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
 
     // STEER: safety check on bytes 2-3
     if ((to_send->RIR>>21) == 0x2E4) {
-      int16_t desired_torque = (to_send->RDLR & 0xFF00) | ((to_send->RDLR >> 16) & 0xFF);
-      int16_t violation = 0;
+      int desired_torque = (to_send->RDLR & 0xFF00) | ((to_send->RDLR >> 16) & 0xFF);
+      desired_torque = to_signed(desired_torque, 16);
+      int violation = 0;
 
       uint32_t ts = TIM2->CNT;
 
@@ -108,35 +91,16 @@ static int toyota_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send) {
       if (controls_allowed && actuation_limits) {
 
         // *** global torque limit check ***
-        if (desired_torque < -MAX_TORQUE) violation = 1;
-        if (desired_torque > MAX_TORQUE) violation = 1;
-
+        violation |= max_limit_check(desired_torque, MAX_TORQUE);
 
         // *** torque rate limit check ***
-        int16_t highest_allowed_torque = max(desired_torque_last, 0) + MAX_RATE_UP;
-        int16_t lowest_allowed_torque = min(desired_torque_last, 0) - MAX_RATE_UP;
-
-        // if we've exceeded the applied torque, we must start moving toward 0
-        highest_allowed_torque = min(highest_allowed_torque, max(desired_torque_last - MAX_RATE_DOWN, max(torque_meas.max, 0) + MAX_TORQUE_ERROR));
-        lowest_allowed_torque = max(lowest_allowed_torque, min(desired_torque_last + MAX_RATE_DOWN, min(torque_meas.min, 0) - MAX_TORQUE_ERROR));
-
-        // check for violation
-        if ((desired_torque < lowest_allowed_torque) || (desired_torque > highest_allowed_torque)) {
-          violation = 1;
-        }
+        violation |= dist_to_meas_check(desired_torque, desired_torque_last, &torque_meas, MAX_RATE_UP, MAX_RATE_DOWN, MAX_TORQUE_ERROR);
 
         // used next time
         desired_torque_last = desired_torque;
 
-
         // *** torque real time rate limit check ***
-        int16_t highest_rt_torque = max(rt_torque_last, 0) + MAX_RT_DELTA;
-        int16_t lowest_rt_torque = min(rt_torque_last, 0) - MAX_RT_DELTA;
-
-        // check for violation
-        if ((desired_torque < lowest_rt_torque) || (desired_torque > highest_rt_torque)) {
-          violation = 1;
-        }
+        violation |= rt_rate_limit_check(desired_torque, rt_torque_last, MAX_RT_DELTA);
 
         // every RT_INTERVAL set the new limits
         uint32_t ts_elapsed = get_ts_elapsed(ts, ts_last);
@@ -179,10 +143,6 @@ static void toyota_init(int16_t param) {
   dbc_eps_torque_factor = param;
 }
 
-static int toyota_ign_hook() {
-  return -1;
-}
-
 static int toyota_fwd_hook(int bus_num, CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_fwd) {
   return -1;
 }
@@ -192,7 +152,7 @@ const safety_hooks toyota_hooks = {
   .rx = toyota_rx_hook,
   .tx = toyota_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = toyota_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = toyota_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = toyota_fwd_hook,
 };
 
@@ -207,6 +167,6 @@ const safety_hooks toyota_nolimits_hooks = {
   .rx = toyota_rx_hook,
   .tx = toyota_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = toyota_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = toyota_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = toyota_fwd_hook,
 };
diff --git a/board/safety/safety_toyota_ipas.h b/board/safety/safety_toyota_ipas.h
index 6b96c3cdd6..35b7e2b597 100644
--- a/board/safety/safety_toyota_ipas.h
+++ b/board/safety/safety_toyota_ipas.h
@@ -35,13 +35,6 @@ uint32_t ts_angle_last = 0;
 
 int controls_allowed_last = 0;
 
-int to_signed(int d, int bits) {
-  if (d >= (1 << (bits - 1))) {
-    d -= (1 << bits);
-  }
-  return d;
-}
-
 // interp function that holds extreme values
 float interpolate(struct lookup_t xy, float x) {
   int size = sizeof(xy.x) / sizeof(xy.x[0]);
@@ -187,7 +180,7 @@ const safety_hooks toyota_ipas_hooks = {
   .rx = toyota_ipas_rx_hook,
   .tx = toyota_ipas_tx_hook,
   .tx_lin = toyota_tx_lin_hook,
-  .ignition = toyota_ign_hook,
+  .ignition = default_ign_hook,
   .fwd = toyota_fwd_hook,
 };
 
diff --git a/tests/gmbitbang/recv.py b/tests/gmbitbang/recv.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..6eb70aa4ad
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gmbitbang/recv.py
@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import time
+from panda import Panda
+
+p = Panda()
+p.set_safety_mode(Panda.SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT)
+p.set_gmlan(bus=2)
+#p.can_send(0xaaa, "\x00\x00", bus=3)
+last_add = None
+while 1:
+  ret = p.can_recv()
+  if len(ret) > 0:
+    add = ret[0][0]
+    if last_add is not None and add != last_add+1:
+      print "MISS %d %d" % (last_add, add)
+    last_add = add
+    print ret
diff --git a/tests/gmbitbang/rigol.py b/tests/gmbitbang/rigol.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..3d690fdd84
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gmbitbang/rigol.py
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import numpy as np
+import visa
+import matplotlib.pyplot as plt
+
+resources = visa.ResourceManager()
+print resources.list_resources()
+
+scope = resources.open_resource('USB0::0x1AB1::0x04CE::DS1ZA184652242::INSTR', timeout=2000, chunk_size=1024000)
+print(scope.query('*IDN?').strip())
+
+#voltscale = scope.ask_for_values(':CHAN1:SCAL?')[0]
+#voltoffset = scope.ask_for_values(":CHAN1:OFFS?")[0]
+
+#scope.write(":STOP")
+scope.write(":WAV:POIN:MODE RAW")
+scope.write(":WAV:DATA? CHAN1")[10:]
+rawdata = scope.read_raw()
+data = np.frombuffer(rawdata, 'B')
+print data.shape
+
+s1 = data[0:650]
+s2 = data[650:]
+s1i = np.argmax(s1 > 100)
+s2i = np.argmax(s2 > 100)
+s1 = s1[s1i:]
+s2 = s2[s2i:]
+
+plt.plot(s1)
+plt.plot(s2)
+plt.show()
+#data = (data - 130.0 - voltoffset/voltscale*25) / 25 * voltscale
+
+print data
+
diff --git a/tests/gmbitbang/test.py b/tests/gmbitbang/test.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..652ac1ddd8
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gmbitbang/test.py
@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import time
+from panda import Panda
+
+p1 = Panda('380016000551363338383037')
+p2 = Panda('430026000951363338383037')
+
+# this is a test, no safety
+p1.set_safety_mode(Panda.SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT)
+p2.set_safety_mode(Panda.SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT)
+
+# get versions
+print(p1.get_version())
+print(p2.get_version())
+
+# this sets bus 2 to actually be GMLAN
+p2.set_gmlan(bus=2)
+
+# send w bitbang then without
+#iden = 123
+iden = 18000
+#dat = "\x01\x02"
+dat = "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+while 1:
+  iden += 1
+  p1.set_gmlan(bus=None)
+  p1.can_send(iden, dat, bus=3)
+  #p1.set_gmlan(bus=2)
+  #p1.can_send(iden, dat, bus=3)
+  time.sleep(0.01)
+  print p2.can_recv()
+  #exit(0)
+
diff --git a/tests/gmbitbang/test_one.py b/tests/gmbitbang/test_one.py
new file mode 100755
index 0000000000..a398e27803
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gmbitbang/test_one.py
@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python
+import time
+from panda import Panda
+
+p = Panda()
+p.set_safety_mode(Panda.SAFETY_ALLOUTPUT)
+
+# ack any crap on bus
+p.set_gmlan(bus=2)
+time.sleep(0.1)
+while len(p.can_recv()) > 0:
+  print "clearing"
+  time.sleep(0.1)
+print "cleared"
+p.set_gmlan(bus=None)
+
+iden = 18000
+dat = "\x01\x02\x03\x04\x05\x06\x07\x08"
+while 1:
+  iden += 1
+  p.can_send(iden, dat, bus=3)
+  time.sleep(0.01)
+
diff --git a/tests/gmbitbang/test_packer.c b/tests/gmbitbang/test_packer.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f056dd4812
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/gmbitbang/test_packer.c
@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+typedef struct {
+  uint32_t RIR;  /*!< CAN receive FIFO mailbox identifier register */
+  uint32_t RDTR; /*!< CAN receive FIFO mailbox data length control and time stamp register */
+  uint32_t RDLR; /*!< CAN receive FIFO mailbox data low register */
+  uint32_t RDHR; /*!< CAN receive FIFO mailbox data high register */
+} CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef;
+
+#include "../../board/drivers/canbitbang.h"
+
+int main() {
+  char out[300];
+  CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef to_bang = {0};
+  to_bang.RIR = 20 << 21;
+  to_bang.RDTR = 1;
+  to_bang.RDLR = 1;
+
+  int len = get_bit_message(out, &to_bang);
+  printf("T:");
+  for (int i = 0; i < len; i++) {
+    printf("%d", out[i]);
+  }
+  printf("\n");
+  printf("R:0000010010100000100010000010011110111010100111111111111111");
+  printf("\n");
+  return 0;
+}
+
+
+
diff --git a/tests/safety/libpandasafety_py.py b/tests/safety/libpandasafety_py.py
index 2d908488a1..8840c66f31 100644
--- a/tests/safety/libpandasafety_py.py
+++ b/tests/safety/libpandasafety_py.py
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ int get_controls_allowed(void);
 void init_tests_toyota(void);
 void set_timer(int t);
 void set_torque_meas(int min, int max);
+void set_cadillac_torque_driver(int min, int max);
+void set_gm_torque_driver(int min, int max);
 void set_rt_torque_last(int t);
 void set_desired_torque_last(int t);
 int get_torque_meas_min(void);
@@ -51,6 +53,22 @@ void honda_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
 int honda_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send);
 int get_brake_prev(void);
 int get_gas_prev(void);
+void set_honda_alt_brake_msg(bool);
+void set_bosch_hardware(bool);
+
+void init_tests_cadillac(void);
+void cadillac_init(int16_t param);
+void cadillac_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
+int cadillac_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send);
+void set_cadillac_desired_torque_last(int t);
+void set_cadillac_rt_torque_last(int t);
+
+void init_tests_gm(void);
+void gm_init(int16_t param);
+void gm_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
+int gm_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send);
+void set_gm_desired_torque_last(int t);
+void set_gm_rt_torque_last(int t);
 
 void toyota_ipas_rx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_push);
 int toyota_ipas_tx_hook(CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *to_send);
diff --git a/tests/safety/test.c b/tests/safety/test.c
index eb19ab28c0..f0f2af506d 100644
--- a/tests/safety/test.c
+++ b/tests/safety/test.c
@@ -23,6 +23,8 @@ typedef struct
 } TIM_TypeDef;
 
 struct sample_t torque_meas;
+struct sample_t cadillac_torque_driver;
+struct sample_t gm_torque_driver;
 
 TIM_TypeDef timer;
 TIM_TypeDef *TIM2 = &timer;
@@ -63,6 +65,16 @@ void set_torque_meas(int min, int max){
   torque_meas.max = max;
 }
 
+void set_cadillac_torque_driver(int min, int max){
+  cadillac_torque_driver.min = min;
+  cadillac_torque_driver.max = max;
+}
+
+void set_gm_torque_driver(int min, int max){
+  gm_torque_driver.min = min;
+  gm_torque_driver.max = max;
+}
+
 int get_torque_meas_min(void){
   return torque_meas.min;
 }
@@ -75,10 +87,27 @@ void set_rt_torque_last(int t){
   rt_torque_last = t;
 }
 
+void set_cadillac_rt_torque_last(int t){
+  cadillac_rt_torque_last = t;
+}
+
+void set_gm_rt_torque_last(int t){
+  gm_rt_torque_last = t;
+}
+
 void set_desired_torque_last(int t){
   desired_torque_last = t;
 }
 
+void set_cadillac_desired_torque_last(int t){
+  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) cadillac_desired_torque_last[i] = t;
+}
+
+void set_gm_desired_torque_last(int t){
+  gm_desired_torque_last = t;
+}
+
+
 int get_ego_speed(void){
   return ego_speed;
 }
@@ -91,6 +120,14 @@ int get_gas_prev(void){
   return gas_prev;
 }
 
+void set_honda_alt_brake_msg(bool c){
+  honda_alt_brake_msg = c;
+}
+
+void set_bosch_hardware(bool c){
+  bosch_hardware = c;
+}
+
 void init_tests_toyota(void){
   torque_meas.min = 0;
   torque_meas.max = 0;
@@ -100,6 +137,24 @@ void init_tests_toyota(void){
   set_timer(0);
 }
 
+void init_tests_cadillac(void){
+  cadillac_torque_driver.min = 0;
+  cadillac_torque_driver.max = 0;
+  for (int i = 0; i < 4; i++) cadillac_desired_torque_last[i] = 0;
+  cadillac_rt_torque_last = 0;
+  cadillac_ts_last = 0;
+  set_timer(0);
+}
+
+void init_tests_gm(void){
+  gm_torque_driver.min = 0;
+  gm_torque_driver.max = 0;
+  gm_desired_torque_last = 0;
+  gm_rt_torque_last = 0;
+  gm_ts_last = 0;
+  set_timer(0);
+}
+
 void init_tests_honda(void){
   ego_speed = 0;
   gas_interceptor_detected = 0;
diff --git a/tests/safety/test_cadillac.py b/tests/safety/test_cadillac.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..53c943e966
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/safety/test_cadillac.py
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python2
+import unittest
+import numpy as np
+import libpandasafety_py
+
+MAX_RATE_UP = 2
+MAX_RATE_DOWN = 5
+MAX_TORQUE = 150
+
+MAX_RT_DELTA = 75
+RT_INTERVAL = 250000
+
+DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE = 50;
+DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR = 4;
+
+IPAS_OVERRIDE_THRESHOLD = 200
+
+def twos_comp(val, bits):
+  if val >= 0:
+    return val
+  else:
+    return (2**bits) + val
+
+def sign(a):
+  if a > 0:
+    return 1
+  else:
+    return -1
+
+class TestCadillacSafety(unittest.TestCase):
+  @classmethod
+  def setUp(cls):
+    cls.safety = libpandasafety_py.libpandasafety
+    cls.safety.cadillac_init(0)
+    cls.safety.init_tests_cadillac()
+
+  def _set_prev_torque(self, t):
+    self.safety.set_cadillac_desired_torque_last(t)
+    self.safety.set_cadillac_rt_torque_last(t)
+
+  def _torque_driver_msg(self, torque):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 0x164 << 21
+
+    t = twos_comp(torque, 11)
+    to_send[0].RDLR = ((t >> 8) & 0x7) | ((t & 0xFF) << 8)
+    return to_send
+
+  def _torque_driver_msg_array(self, torque):
+    for i in range(3):
+      self.safety.cadillac_ipas_rx_hook(self._torque_driver_msg(torque))
+
+  def _torque_msg(self, torque):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 0x151 << 21
+
+    t = twos_comp(torque, 14)
+    to_send[0].RDLR = ((t >> 8) & 0x3F) | ((t & 0xFF) << 8)
+    return to_send
+
+  def test_default_controls_not_allowed(self):
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_manually_enable_controls_allowed(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+
+  def test_enable_control_allowed_from_cruise(self):
+    to_push = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_push[0].RIR = 0x370 << 21
+    to_push[0].RDLR = 0x800000
+    to_push[0].RDTR = 0
+
+    self.safety.cadillac_rx_hook(to_push)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_disable_control_allowed_from_cruise(self):
+    to_push = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_push[0].RIR = 0x370 << 21
+    to_push[0].RDLR = 0
+    to_push[0].RDTR = 0
+
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.cadillac_rx_hook(to_push)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_torque_absolute_limits(self):
+    for controls_allowed in [True, False]:
+      for torque in np.arange(-MAX_TORQUE - 1000, MAX_TORQUE + 1000, MAX_RATE_UP):
+        self.safety.set_controls_allowed(controls_allowed)
+        self.safety.set_cadillac_rt_torque_last(torque)
+        self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(0, 0)
+        self.safety.set_cadillac_desired_torque_last(torque - MAX_RATE_UP)
+
+        if controls_allowed:
+          send = (-MAX_TORQUE <= torque <= MAX_TORQUE)
+        else:
+          send = torque == 0
+
+        self.assertEqual(send, self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(torque)))
+
+  def test_non_realtime_limit_up(self):
+    self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(0, 0)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_RATE_UP)))
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_RATE_UP)))
+
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_RATE_UP + 1)))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_RATE_UP - 1)))
+
+  def test_non_realtime_limit_down(self):
+    self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(0, 0)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+  def test_exceed_torque_sensor(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      for t in np.arange(0, DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1, 1):
+        t *= -sign
+        self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(t, t)
+        self._set_prev_torque(MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_TORQUE * sign)))
+
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1, DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_TORQUE)))
+
+    # spot check some individual cases
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      driver_torque = (DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 10) * sign
+      torque_desired = (MAX_TORQUE - 10 * DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR) * sign
+      delta = 1 * sign
+      self._set_prev_torque(torque_desired)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(-driver_torque, -driver_torque)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(torque_desired)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(torque_desired + delta)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(-driver_torque, -driver_torque)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(torque_desired + delta)))
+
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(-MAX_TORQUE * sign, -MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg((MAX_TORQUE - MAX_RATE_DOWN) * sign)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(-MAX_TORQUE * sign, -MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(0)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(-MAX_TORQUE * sign, -MAX_TORQUE * sign)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg((MAX_TORQUE - MAX_RATE_DOWN + 1) * sign)))
+
+
+  def test_realtime_limits(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      self.safety.init_tests_cadillac()
+      self._set_prev_torque(0)
+      self.safety.set_cadillac_torque_driver(0, 0)
+      for t in np.arange(0, MAX_RT_DELTA, 1):
+        t *= sign
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA + 1))))
+
+      self._set_prev_torque(0)
+      for t in np.arange(0, MAX_RT_DELTA, 1):
+        t *= sign
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+
+      # Increase timer to update rt_torque_last
+      self.safety.set_timer(RT_INTERVAL + 1)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA - 1))))
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.cadillac_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA + 1))))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+  unittest.main()
diff --git a/tests/safety/test_gm.py b/tests/safety/test_gm.py
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..f11360dbe2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tests/safety/test_gm.py
@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+#!/usr/bin/env python2
+import unittest
+import numpy as np
+import libpandasafety_py
+
+MAX_RATE_UP = 7
+MAX_RATE_DOWN = 17
+MAX_STEER = 255
+MAX_BRAKE = 350
+MAX_GAS = 3072
+MAX_REGEN = 1404
+
+MAX_RT_DELTA = 128
+RT_INTERVAL = 250000
+
+DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE = 50;
+DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR = 4;
+
+def twos_comp(val, bits):
+  if val >= 0:
+    return val
+  else:
+    return (2**bits) + val
+
+def sign(a):
+  if a > 0:
+    return 1
+  else:
+    return -1
+
+class TestGmSafety(unittest.TestCase):
+  @classmethod
+  def setUp(cls):
+    cls.safety = libpandasafety_py.libpandasafety
+    cls.safety.gm_init(0)
+    cls.safety.init_tests_gm()
+
+  def _speed_msg(self, speed):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 842 << 21
+    to_send[0].RDLR = speed
+    return to_send
+
+  def _button_msg(self, buttons):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 481 << 21
+    to_send[0].RDHR = buttons << 12
+    return to_send
+
+  def _brake_msg(self, brake):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 241 << 21
+    to_send[0].RDLR = 0xa00 if brake else 0x900
+    return to_send
+
+  def _gas_msg(self, gas):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 417 << 21
+    to_send[0].RDHR = (1 << 16) if gas else 0
+    return to_send
+
+  def _send_brake_msg(self, brake):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 789 << 21
+    brake = (-brake) & 0xfff
+    to_send[0].RDLR = (brake >> 8) | ((brake &0xff) << 8)
+    return to_send
+
+  def _send_gas_msg(self, gas):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 715 << 21
+    to_send[0].RDLR = ((gas & 0x1f) << 27) | ((gas & 0xfe0) << 11)
+    return to_send
+
+  def _set_prev_torque(self, t):
+    self.safety.set_gm_desired_torque_last(t)
+    self.safety.set_gm_rt_torque_last(t)
+
+  def _torque_driver_msg(self, torque):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 388 << 21
+
+    t = twos_comp(torque, 11)
+    to_send[0].RDHR = (((t >> 8) & 0x7) << 16) | ((t & 0xFF) << 24)
+    return to_send
+
+  def _torque_driver_msg_array(self, torque):
+    for i in range(3):
+      self.safety.gm_ipas_rx_hook(self._torque_driver_msg(torque))
+
+  def _torque_msg(self, torque):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 384 << 21
+
+    t = twos_comp(torque, 11)
+    to_send[0].RDLR = ((t >> 8) & 0x7) | ((t & 0xFF) << 8)
+    return to_send
+
+  def test_default_controls_not_allowed(self):
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_resume_button(self):
+    RESUME_BTN = 2
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._button_msg(RESUME_BTN))
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_set_button(self):
+    SET_BTN = 3
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._button_msg(SET_BTN))
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_cancel_button(self):
+    CANCEL_BTN = 6
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._button_msg(CANCEL_BTN))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_disengage_on_brake(self): 
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_allow_brake_at_zero_speed(self):
+    # Brake was already pressed
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(False))
+
+  def test_not_allow_brake_when_moving(self):
+    # Brake was already pressed
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._speed_msg(100))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(False))
+
+  def test_disengage_on_gas(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._gas_msg(True))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._gas_msg(False))
+
+  def test_allow_engage_with_gas_pressed(self):
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._gas_msg(True))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._gas_msg(True))
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.gm_rx_hook(self._gas_msg(False))
+
+  def test_brake_safety_check(self):
+    for enabled in [0, 1]:
+      for b in range(0, 500):
+        self.safety.set_controls_allowed(enabled)
+        if abs(b) > MAX_BRAKE or (not enabled and b != 0):
+          self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._send_brake_msg(b)))
+        else:
+          self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._send_brake_msg(b)))
+
+  def test_gas_safety_check(self):
+    for enabled in [0, 1]:
+      for g in range(0, 2**12-1):
+        self.safety.set_controls_allowed(enabled)
+        if abs(g) > MAX_GAS or (not enabled and g != MAX_REGEN):
+          self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._send_gas_msg(g)))
+        else:
+          self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._send_gas_msg(g)))
+
+  def test_steer_safety_check(self):
+    for enabled in [0, 1]:
+      for t in range(-0x200, 0x200):
+        self.safety.set_controls_allowed(enabled)
+        self._set_prev_torque(t)
+        if abs(t) > MAX_STEER or (not enabled and abs(t) > 0):
+          self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+        else:
+          self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+
+  def test_manually_enable_controls_allowed(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
+  def test_non_realtime_limit_up(self):
+    self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(0, 0)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_RATE_UP)))
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_RATE_UP)))
+
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_RATE_UP + 1)))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+    self._set_prev_torque(0)
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_RATE_UP - 1)))
+
+  def test_non_realtime_limit_down(self):
+    self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(0, 0)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+  def test_against_torque_driver(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      for t in np.arange(0, DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1, 1):
+        t *= -sign
+        self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(t, t)
+        self._set_prev_torque(MAX_STEER * sign)
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(MAX_STEER * sign)))
+
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1, DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 1)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(-MAX_STEER)))
+
+    # spot check some individual cases
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      driver_torque = (DRIVER_TORQUE_ALLOWANCE + 10) * sign
+      torque_desired = (MAX_STEER - 10 * DRIVER_TORQUE_FACTOR) * sign
+      delta = 1 * sign
+      self._set_prev_torque(torque_desired)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(-driver_torque, -driver_torque)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(torque_desired)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(torque_desired + delta)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(-driver_torque, -driver_torque)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(torque_desired + delta)))
+
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(-MAX_STEER * sign, -MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg((MAX_STEER - MAX_RATE_DOWN) * sign)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(-MAX_STEER * sign, -MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(0)))
+      self._set_prev_torque(MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(-MAX_STEER * sign, -MAX_STEER * sign)
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg((MAX_STEER - MAX_RATE_DOWN + 1) * sign)))
+
+
+  def test_realtime_limits(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(True)
+
+    for sign in [-1, 1]:
+      self.safety.init_tests_gm()
+      self._set_prev_torque(0)
+      self.safety.set_gm_torque_driver(0, 0)
+      for t in np.arange(0, MAX_RT_DELTA, 1):
+        t *= sign
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+      self.assertFalse(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA + 1))))
+
+      self._set_prev_torque(0)
+      for t in np.arange(0, MAX_RT_DELTA, 1):
+        t *= sign
+        self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(t)))
+
+      # Increase timer to update rt_torque_last
+      self.safety.set_timer(RT_INTERVAL + 1)
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA - 1))))
+      self.assertTrue(self.safety.gm_tx_hook(self._torque_msg(sign * (MAX_RT_DELTA + 1))))
+
+
+if __name__ == "__main__":
+  unittest.main()
diff --git a/tests/safety/test_honda.py b/tests/safety/test_honda.py
index fb169af7e3..143916d609 100755
--- a/tests/safety/test_honda.py
+++ b/tests/safety/test_honda.py
@@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
 
     return to_send
 
-  def _button_msg(self, buttons):
+  def _button_msg(self, buttons, msg):
     to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
-    to_send[0].RIR = 0x1A6 << 21
+    to_send[0].RIR = msg << 21
     to_send[0].RDLR = buttons << 5
 
     return to_send
@@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
 
     return to_send
 
+  def _alt_brake_msg(self, brake):
+    to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
+    to_send[0].RIR = 0x1BE << 21
+    to_send[0].RDLR = 0x10 if brake else 0
+
+    return to_send
+
   def _gas_msg(self, gas):
     to_send = libpandasafety_py.ffi.new('CAN_FIFOMailBox_TypeDef *')
     to_send[0].RIR = 0x17C << 21
@@ -65,18 +72,20 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
 
   def test_resume_button(self):
     RESUME_BTN = 4
-    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(RESUME_BTN))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(RESUME_BTN, 0x1A6))
     self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
 
   def test_set_button(self):
     SET_BTN = 3
-    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(SET_BTN))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(SET_BTN, 0x1A6))
     self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
 
   def test_cancel_button(self):
     CANCEL_BTN = 2
     self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
-    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(CANCEL_BTN))
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._button_msg(CANCEL_BTN, 0x1A6))
     self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
 
   def test_sample_speed(self):
@@ -94,6 +103,17 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
     self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(1))
     self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
 
+  def test_alt_disengage_on_brake(self):
+    self.safety.set_honda_alt_brake_msg(1)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._alt_brake_msg(1))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    
+    self.safety.set_honda_alt_brake_msg(0)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._alt_brake_msg(1))
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+
   def test_allow_brake_at_zero_speed(self):
     # Brake was already pressed
     self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
@@ -101,6 +121,7 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
 
     self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(True))
     self.assertTrue(self.safety.get_controls_allowed())
+    self.safety.honda_rx_hook(self._brake_msg(False))  # reset no brakes
 
   def test_not_allow_brake_when_moving(self):
     # Brake was already pressed
@@ -136,13 +157,29 @@ class TestHondaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
     self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_brake_msg(0x00F0)))
 
   def test_gas_safety_check(self):
-    self.assertTrue(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_brake_msg(0x0000)))
-    self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_brake_msg(0x1000)))
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_gas_msg(0x0000)))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_gas_msg(0x1000)))
 
   def test_steer_safety_check(self):
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
     self.assertTrue(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_steer_msg(0x0000)))
     self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._send_steer_msg(0x1000)))
 
+  def test_spam_cancel_safety_check(self):
+    RESUME_BTN = 4
+    SET_BTN = 3
+    CANCEL_BTN = 2
+    BUTTON_MSG = 0x296
+    self.safety.set_bosch_hardware(1)
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(0)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._button_msg(CANCEL_BTN, BUTTON_MSG)))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._button_msg(RESUME_BTN, BUTTON_MSG)))
+    self.assertFalse(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._button_msg(SET_BTN, BUTTON_MSG)))
+    # do not block resume if we are engaged already
+    self.safety.set_controls_allowed(1)
+    self.assertTrue(self.safety.honda_tx_hook(self._button_msg(RESUME_BTN, BUTTON_MSG)))
+
 
 if __name__ == "__main__":
   unittest.main()
diff --git a/tests/safety/test_toyota.py b/tests/safety/test_toyota.py
index 1f7a9d0ac0..ad86be63be 100644
--- a/tests/safety/test_toyota.py
+++ b/tests/safety/test_toyota.py
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ class TestToyotaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
     return to_send
 
   def _torque_driver_msg_array(self, torque):
-    for i in range(3):
+    for i in range(6):
       self.safety.toyota_ipas_rx_hook(self._torque_driver_msg(torque))
 
   def _angle_meas_msg(self, angle):
@@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ class TestToyotaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
     return to_send
 
   def _angle_meas_msg_array(self, angle):
-    for i in range(3):
+    for i in range(6):
       self.safety.toyota_ipas_rx_hook(self._angle_meas_msg(angle))
 
   def _torque_msg(self, torque):
@@ -229,6 +229,9 @@ class TestToyotaSafety(unittest.TestCase):
     self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(50))
     self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(-50))
     self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(0))
+    self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(0))
+    self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(0))
+    self.safety.toyota_rx_hook(self._torque_meas_msg(0))
 
     self.assertEqual(-51, self.safety.get_torque_meas_min())
     self.assertEqual(51, self.safety.get_torque_meas_max())